Why Mubarak’s Fall unlikely to bring democracy in Egypt| Dreams of a Typewriter

Mubarak may be gone, but a spontaneous people’s revolution means lack of strength to negotiate with the new military government. Chances of democracy being instituted in the country remain slight because pressure of the protests has disintegrated.

About a decade ago, well-respected professor from Stanford, James Fearon, wrote an interesting paper “Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?” (.pdf) explaining the length of Bosnian Crisis. He explained that in Bosnia the ethnic majority faced something called Commitment Problems. It logic goes like this: Party A (the majority) and Party B (the minority) are dividing country’s resources after independence. A promises to give B 20% of the resources if B lets A form the government. But once government is formed, A is stronger and able to suppress B, giving them only 10% instead of agreed 20. Hence, it is said that A faces Commitment Problems.

In other words, while a government would promise its people something today, if it is stronger tomorrow, it is likely to renege on its promise. Something like this is about to unfold in Egypt. Military, after overthrowing Mubarak, is promising the people democracy. But that doesn’t mean that the Army itself wants democracy. If it is in a stronger position tomorrow, it is unlikely to bring in democracy.

To begin with, the statement that Military took over from Mubarak is rubbish. Admittedly, Military and Mubarak are two different entities but not to a great extent. Military has ruled the country since 1953, under three different dictators and it would be incorrect to say that armed forces had minimal role in governance under Mubarak regime. It was running the country and Mubarak was its chosen leader.

It was not in Military’s interest to kick Mubarak out (which it always had the power to do, as pointed out by this blog) in December 2010. But within two months it had ended a 29-year-old dictatorship. What changed in last one month? Relentless protests by the Egyptian people and growing international pressure, the two forces that forced army’s hand. It is important to understand the subtle politics at play with these two forces.

The people’s protest, organized ad hoc and fuelled by Twitter and Facebook, was a once-in-a-lifetime event which is unlikely to repeat itself anytime soon. While the protesters camped out in Tahrir Square and came off brilliantly on camera, they failed to organize themselves or create a viable leadership hierarchy. Now that Mubarak is gone, they will most likely disintegrate, leaving no institutional legacy like a political party or a popular leader. That removes one of the critical factors from the equation.

As for the international pressure, it was predicated on the reaction of people from all over the world that was fuelled by what we saw on TV. Now that Egypt is old news and Yemen and Algeria are simmering with rage, media (read: Al Jazeera and Twitter) are likely to move on to more happening countries of the Arab World. It is very similar to the fate of Tunisia which went from being an unknown country to the global headlines and back to obscurity within a month. In the absence of media attention, governments of US and Europe would have no interest in taking on democratic Egypt. Especially since governments around the world were hesitant in calling out for Mubarak’s ouster in the first place. Everyone likes the Egypt’s foreign policy as of now and no one wants to upset the balance by bringing in an unpredictable democratic government.

With these two driving forces gone, the people of Egypt would be unable to pressure the Military to bring in a new era of democracy. There would be simply no incentive for it to relinquish its power. There may be some sort of elections. But be sure to expect electoral fraud and military-sponsored governments, unless the international pressure is maintained.